The brain famously has two sides which are connected, yet essentially constitute two parallel distinctive brains much like most humans animals have many other double organs such as double hands, double feet and double lungs. The two brains are as other double organs similar, yet not identical. There are thus two centers of cognition in the brain, meaning that sentient agency of cognition is anatomically dual, split, double or twin depending on how one prefers to describe it.
The two brains engage in checks and balances in behaviorally limiting each other’s influence over body movements such a speech. Cognitive states such as interrogation, hypnosis, speaking in tongues and intoxication with recreational drugs exhibit however the phenomenon of “the subconscious speaking”.
It is common to experience a fellow person (e.g. a spouse) as having “two sides” which may be quite behaviorally distinctive. The distinctiveness between “the two sides” varies greatly between different persons from almost indistinguishable to highly distinctive indeed. The “two sides” have not only separate albeit related personas (which in many persons seem indistinguishable) but each one of the two brains has its own subconscious as well.
The fact that there are two interconnected brains rather than one single brain means that cognitive contradictions inevitably appear between the two brains. For example may one of the two brains for some reason prioritize sexual desire while the other side of the brain for some other reason may prioritize fear such as concern for physical safety and/or rejection of personhood. Daily cognitive life presents innumerable instances of conflicts between the two brains, in the two brains performing sort of mutual checks and balances on each other. Many psychological problems are in fact derived from conflicts between the two brains.
There are furthermore conflicts between the conscious level and the subconscious level within each one of the two brains. This means that sentient agency of cognition is multicentered and distinctly non-singular. despite being anatomically centered in parallel in the two brains.
While defense mechanisms do police the bisection between the conscious and the subconscious are what are known as defense mechanisms also instrumental in providing checks and balances between the two brains. There is also reason to believe that some religious experiences such as prayer commonly involves communication between the two brains.
There is thus no single center of cognition and so personhood is not actually singular but rich, diverse and anatomically decentered. Conflicts between the two brains do however typically cause much psychological suffering in the two brains frequently having different and competing agendas. It is also clear from the phenomenon of a person having “two sides to his personality” that the two sides of the brain take turns in controlling behavioral agency. It is also common that conflicts between the two brains result in relative behavioral paralysis as shyness, frustration, fear, confusion, procrastination and self-contradiction are often precisely expressive of conflict of interest between the two brains. Internal (i.e. not interpersonal) psychological suffering therefore typically results from conflicts between the two brains.
In evolutionary terms does this serve as a protective mechanism (literally checks and balances) whose purpose it is to protect the person from enacting behaviors which may cause the person harm one way or another whether directly or indirectly so.
Trauma is a sort of psychological memory whose purpose it is to protect the person from repeating mistakes with potential to cause harm to the person. Much like we develop psychological memories that help us avert dangerous physical objects such as a hotplate on a stove do we develop psychological memories with the purpose of helping us avert socio-psychological situations which one way or another may turn out harmful to us. Identity and trauma are essentially the same phenomenon as the trauma (in the sense as introjection remaining conscious for at least some time) is created by means of defensively neurologically introjecting elements of another person by means of neurological contact and usually inadvertently so, strongly memorizing a situation and/or creating lasting emotional associations with a physical object.
While conscious identities may seem “positive” do they also emerge as a form of trauma and the “identification” with other persons whether one person, a group of persons or a hypothetical mass category of persons is meant to psychologically attach us to other persons by means of neurological contact for protective purposes and hence socially invented categories of persons become global networks of mass neurological contact. A stone age human could only survive if closely psychologically attached to a tribal extended family and so identity as a mechanism is Animal Herd behavior with the purpose of ensuring mutual socio-psychological safety.
The phenomenon of identity creates a mental illusion whereby the person implausibly identifies as a category/group. The person will thus performatively say that “HE IS” a man and a Rockefeller, yet these statements are performative and essentially illusory in the sense as these groups do not strictly speaking exist other than as collective mental phenomena as describing various types of diversity. E.g. are chronological seven-year olds not a group of persons but rather an externally defined cluster of persons as described and discursively reduced to a so called “group”. It would initially seem somewhat absurd if someone claimed that chronological sixty-one-year olds all belonged to a single group or that all persons sharing the same birthday somehow belonged to a single group, yet it would not be difficult to discursively convince others about that by means of invention of physionomistic categories, subsequent social construction, establishment of global neurological networks and global identity politics.
Thus it is easy to socially construct a purported “group” by means of inventing a physionomistic or other social category on the basis of some discursively perceived (i.e. socially constructed) “common denominator” whether socially constructed as anatomical or otherwise as it would be possible to e.g. clinically invent a physionomistically peformative diagnostic category of “persons with a wart on the nose”. The originally imaginary “category” socially constructed common denominator may subsequently be turned into an interacting subcultural community by means of development of communal identity, i.e. a global neurological network. That is how innovative forms of physionomistic structural oppression emerged in modernity as beginning with historical inventions of taxonomistic new physionomistic categories as often having later led to the development of identity politics with emancipatory intention.
Humans live in complex societies with often contradictory rules of assigned/elective affiliations with multiple physionomistic and other social categories/groups. Group identity typically develops due to a person suffering structural oppression or some other emotionally painful psychological experience as producing trauma, although emotional pain as arising from traumas usually disappears within hours, days or weeks.
Psychological contradiction is the main factor behind internal psychological suffering although of course there is much psychological suffering that is directly experienced as part of interpersonal interaction.
Cognitive contradictions may however be conceptualized and therefore also better understood. Psychotherapy is hence the art and science of resolving psychological contradictions by means of emotional intellectualization through dialogue.
The fields of psychology and brain research thus need to better understand how cognitive contradictions appear and are sometimes perpetuated by emotionally detrimental lasting traumas. The iterative nature of lasting painful trauma may however become permanently interrupted by re-understanding the neurological process of emotional iteration. Trauma is thus not merely a psychological phenomenon but importantly also a neurological one.
Traumas may be treated by means ending conscious/subconscious identification, by supplanting the existing trauma with a new harmless trauma and by theatrically repeating the traumatic situation in a manner that is possible to understand and intellectualize and thus psychologically externalize. Social Behavioral Therapy (SBT) which is essentially group performance of role play may thus become deployed for treating traumas in addition to recoding individual behavioral expression of structural oppression and so teach participants how to react in new ways to familiar situations.
This leads us to the decentralized nature of sentient agency of cognition as constituting a neural network much like a network interface controller. There is thus no single center of consciousness but consciousness rather operates by means of electro-chemical reactions within a neural network. Consciousness is hence not merely anatomical as the two brains are merely the centers of the fully-body neural system and so consciousness is not limited to the brain and is obviously not even limited to the body but extends far beyond that, including through neurological contact which is limited in time but not in space as two persons on different continents may still fall in love despite not even having met each other. Since mutually falling in love is about mutual introjection is physical proximity not a requirement for neurological contact and so the “the chemistry of interpersonality” needs to be extensively studied by neurology, physics and obviously brain research as well in turning psychology into an exact natural science indeed.
This in turn will crucially facilitate transforming further sciences such as sociology, anthropology, zoology, economics, linguistics and critical theory into exact natural sciences as psychology is literally the intersection of nature and nurture in cognitive contradiction (aporia) being actually being the essence of philosophy itself.