Unified Kurdistani independence is a matter of when and how, yet this requires a unified Kurdistani movement as ready to responsibly implement everything necessary in the transition to freedom, emancipation and representative governance; including feminist social revolution and of course importantly communal reversion to Kurdistani indigenous religion by communally phasing out religious imperialism. The AKP regime structure will certainly not be allowed to stand in the way of unified Kurdistani independence and so an organized withdrawal and handover of power to a Kurdistani unity government is certainly most preferable in every way.
Turkey is effectively no longer a NATO member with respect to the Kurdish issue. Not only Israel and America, but Europe and indeed the international community at large understands that unified Kurdistani independence is only a matter of how and when. The feminist PKK state of Rojava (West Kurdistan & North Syria) is now a senior NATO partner and the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood AKP regime structure still sponsors Jihadist terrorist organizations in Syria including the Nusra Front (the Syrian branch of al Qaida) means that the AKP has effectively led Turkey out of the NATO alliance with respect to Syria, Iraq and Kurdistan.
The world is hesitant to speak out publicly for fear of playing into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood AKP and alienating Turkish public opinion, yet the international community is deeply concerned about the widespread destruction in Kurdish cities as caused by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in North Kurdistan (Bakur) as still occupied by Turkey.
The Turkish occupation of North Kurdistan and a part of Syria/Rojava has no security rationale and zero democratic legitimacy. TAF is not wanted in the economically undeveloped North Kurdistan which is furthermore an economic burden for Turkey as a direct result of Turkish ethnocratic suppression against the Kurds.
Yet, the world has mounting political concerns about the readiness of two of the three major Kurdish political parties for unified Kurdistani independence. The KDP remains stuck in its profoundly unpatriotic patterns of diplomacy (to put things mildly) which has made it vehemently unpopular among most Kurds. The PKK has successfully established its own anarchist/libertarian feminist state in Rojava (West Kurdistan & North Syria) yet there are indeed mounting concerns in the international community, including in Jerusalem and Washington that the feminist revolution there might revert to the PKK’s past totalitarian political patterns. The former cult of personality with respect to the founder of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, has not entirely disappeared and there is concern that a unified independent Kurdistan will thus turn into a totalitarian one-party state. The PUK has decent working relations with both the KDP and the PKK and the PUK should therefore serve as a diplomatic bridge between the KDP and the PKK.
Since there are serious doubts about the sincerity of intentions of the KDP and the PKK, both of which would surely wage war against each other were they not held back by Jerusalem and Washington is it clear that the PUK needs to take the diplomatic lead in building independent unified Kurdistan. The international community obviously has no interest in an independent unified Kurdistan turning into a second South Sudan as that new nation state sadly collapsed into oil-funded civil war.
While some in the international community have doubts about the PUK due to its good relations with Iran are those concerns largely unwarranted. The PUK represents the moderate middle way between the left-wing PKK and the right-wing KDP. The PUK has successfully managed its diplomatic relations which stand in sharp contrast to the pervasive diplomatic incompetence of both the KDP and the PKK.
The Kurdistani movement has more international support than ever before and Israel’s partners in the countries surrounding Kurdistan certainly do now accept unified Kurdistani independence. The question thus is not whether there should be an independent unified Kurdistan but rather what kind of Kurdistan? What kind of society will it be and what kind of political system will it have?
Unified Kurdistani independence is certainly within reach and the tools for attaining that are increasingly ready for use, yet the Kurdistani movement is unable to attain unified Kurdistani independence without support from Jerusalem, Washington and our other allies in the region. Rojava needs to understand that it does not exist in a vacuum and that self-governing Rojava would not even exist had not Jerusalem successfully persuaded Damascus of the political wisdom of withdrawing from Kurdish regions.
Israel supports Kurdistani political parties only to the degree that those political parties themselves represent Kurdistani interests. There is no question that the PUK is best suited for leading Kurdistan to independence considering that the KDP and PKK do not yet seem ready to fully leave old tragic patterns of former political behavior.
The three Kurdish political parties have made diplomatic commitments to each other which are fully upheld by the PUK while the KDP and PKK yet have to fully liberate themselves from tragic patterns of their own past. Freedom is not free and the international community expects the KDP and the PKK to stand by their diplomatic commitments no less than does the PUK.
What is needed therefore is for the three main Kurdistani political parties to form a semi-secret provisional government under the leadership of the PUK; meaning with a prime minister from the PUK. The new semi-secret unity government certainly needs have its seat in Sulaymaniyah, the capital of the PUK self-governing region considering the questionable credentials of the KDP and the PKK. The first tasks at hand are devising a unified and credible foreign policy for Kurdistan in representing all three self-governing regions as well as merging existing Kurdish militias into a unified Kurdistani military.
The KDP and the PKK will quickly discover that Jerusalem and Washington will stand united with those who stand with Kurdistani national interests and so both parties are particularly well advised to refrain from undemocratic and unpatriotic behavioral patterns. In order to make this work need the government be led by the PUK while the chain of command of a unified Kurdistani military needs be fully under control of Israeli Kurdish military specialists.
Freedom is not free and the moderate PUK through its sophisticated diplomatic policy has certainly made it clear that it indeed takes its name (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) quite seriously. This is not to deny that the PUK too has a tragic historical past, but rather that the PUK has shown considerable determination to disentangle itself from that very tragic past.
While the PKK and the KDP were busy insulting friendly diplomatic representatives has the PUK shown its political maturity and readiness for unified Kurdistani independence. There is no doubt that significant political participation of Israeli Kurds in early independent unified Kurdistan is precisely essential in making sure that there will not ever again be brakuji, i.e. Kurdish internecine war.
The KDP and the PKK will find out that Jerusalem and Washington will favor the PUK over the two other parties as long as these two other parties display unpatriotic political behaviors. The three existing Kurdistani self-governing regions are each for all practical purposes one-party states, yet unified independent Kurdistan will not under any conditions be allowed to become either a failed state or a totalitarian state. Decentralization and federalism by means of major cantons are key to ensuring democratic stability in Kurdistan. The Kurdish political parties are expected to act rationally, patriotically and democratically and therefore generally put Kurdistani interests over partisan interests.
Israel has sponsored the KDP since 1963, the PUK since 1986 and the PKK since 2004, yet Israel always did so with the purpose in mind of establishing a unified independent Kurdistan and so Israel’s sponsorship of all secular Kurdistani political parties is completely subordinate to Israel’s support for unified Kurdistani independence.
There is growing international readiness to quietly support a military escalation with the goal of ending the Turkish occupation of parts of Syria and Kurdistan. The Muslim Brotherhood regime structure in Ankara would be particularly well advised considering “literally everything” to prepare a plan for military withdrawal and disengagement from Syria and Kurdistan just as the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Khartoum under military pressure from the Israeli-sponsored SPLA ultimately agreed to vacate South Sudan. If they do not do so voluntarily are there means and options at the disposal of a unified Kurdistan movement to compel such a withdrawal by sheer force.
Neither the Muslim Brotherhood AKP regime, nor the Dönmeh-led Derin Devlet (which has aligned itself with the Kurdistani movement) have ever been Turkish nationalists as the rhetoric of Turkish nationalism has always been a hypocritical veneer of power in Ankara.
The AKP regime structure needs to prepare a seriously and sincerely intended withdrawal plan or else later face the reality of military escalation so as to force the demoralized Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to fully withdraw from Syria and Kurdistan, including ending all sponsorship of Jihadist militias on Syrian territory. The means, tools and options to attain that will be at the disposal of a politically unified Free Kurdistan and its close allies and so any AKP-led violent opposition to withdrawal would literally be completely futile. Let’s be abundantly clear that “god” is certainly not on the side of kleptocratic munafiqun of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.
An organized withdrawal as carried out by the Khartoum Muslim Brotherhood regime from territories which became South Sudan is certainly preferable to a disreputable withdrawal in disgrace such as Pakistan’s military collapse in Indian-sponsored East Pakistan which subsequently became independent Bangladesh. A forced withdrawal will hardly look good in Turkish public opinion and so should an organized handover of power to a new Sulaymaniyah-based Kurdistani unity government surely be preferable in every way.