Free Kurdistan needs to fashion a joint futuristic diplomatic policy as based on understanding the essential nature of regional strategic political changes on the path to a post-Muslim broader Middle East.
It is common for Kurds to express existential fears about Israel’s support for Free Kurdistan. Israel always helped the Kurdistani liberation movement without asking for anything in return, both because independence for a unified Kurdistan has always been a core Israeli regional interest and importantly because most Kurds are indeed passionate Zionists. America however as symbolized by its ethnically Jewish then Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (b. 1923) who still adheres to a so called realistic, i.e. not idealistic conception of foreign policy was partly complicit in the 1975 Iran-Iraq Algiers Agreement between Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s (1919-1980) Iran and Saddam Hussein’s (1937-2006) Iraq whereby Iran no longer permitted Israel to support the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) armed regional autonomy in Iraqi South Kurdistan (Kurdish Bashur) through Rojhelat (East Kurdistan within the borders of Iran).
Although it is true that modern Kurdish political history is one long history of betrayals by both “allied” occupiers of parts of Kurdistan and culturally Euro-Christian great powers – is the Kurdish conception of alliance still in its infancy. There are essentially two types of relationships in international relations. The first type are alliances of convenience that in theory may change as international interests change and the second type are immutable alliances that importantly also are relationships between two peoples and which are known as special relationships.
The triangular relationship between Israel, the United States and Free Kurdistan is made up of two special relationships; the Israeli-Kurdistani special relationship and the Israeli-American special relationship. Free Kurdistan now however needs to build a special relationship with the United States as well and so Kurdistani leaders therefore need to understand what precisely that means from an American perspective. America existentially supports all liberal democracies worldwide both as an idealistic commitment and as America’s primary core interest in international affairs. Although there are historical cases where America abandoned non-democratic allies are these nevertheless even so historically relatively rare occurrences although America’s 1975 abandonment of the KDP self-governing region in Bashur is indeed one of those rare historical instances.
America differentiates between liberal democracies (for which its support is everlasting and immutable) and non-democracies whose US-allied regimes may in principle be abandoned although even that rarely happens. Kurdistani leaders therefore need to recognize democratization and liberalization as core Kurdistani interests as those are crucial elements in building the kind of immutable and everlasting relationship that Free Kurdistan seeks with the United States of America, in other words a Kurdistani-American special relationship.
An important component in a special relationships is the non-partisan nature of those relationships. That means that a Kurdistani-American special relationship will not be limited to Washington’s diplomatic and security relationship with any particular Kurdish political party and so Kurdistani leaders need to be cognizant that building a non-partisan relationship with Washington is another core Kurdistani interest in the building of a Kurdistani-American special relationship. Furthermore, a special relationship is crucially a bond between two peoples so building further people-to-people ties with the peoples of Israel and America needs to be recognized by Kurdistani leaders as a core Kurdistani national interest indeed. Economic interdependence is another way in international relations to reinforce a political relationship. America’s immutable and everlasting support for liberal democracies worldwide is not only an ethically idealistic political commitment but also an economic interest in the sense as the proliferation of liberal democracy worldwide tends to be followed by political stability and economic development leading to the opening of new markets for the American export industry and so the proliferation of liberal democracy is not only an ethically idealistic commitment but very much a core economic and a core security interest of the United States of America.
Bashur however has traditionally pursued a realistic foreign policy whereby the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) sought to balance its alliance with Israel and the US with building economic ties with the enemies of Kurdistan, in part as a strategic measure intended to avoid military confrontation with Turkey or Iran. As the KRG always feared becoming abandoned by Israel sought the KRG to limit its dependence on Israel by bringing in the US as a third party in the relationship and generally building as many international relationships deemed relevant as it could. The fear of being abandoned by Israel is paradoxical indeed considering that many Kurdish leaders have been educated in Israel and undergone Israeli intelligence training. Rather than reinforce, deepen and broaden the KRG’s special relationship with Israel sought KRG leaders instead to limit its dependence on the one ally of Kurdistan that never abandoned Free Kurdistan and its Kurdish allies. KRG leaders were not even aware that they already had a special relationship with Israel but rather were suspicious why Israel always gave Kurdistani leaders almost whatever they asked for (provided of course that this was achievable and also in the interest of Free Kurdistan) and never asked for anything in return in the context of providing support. This general suspicion was also fueled by the realistic (i.e. non-idealistic) nature of the KRG’s foreign policy and Israel’s own otherwise then realistic (non-idealistic) foreign policy in the Middle East.
Free Kurdistan therefore needs not only be cognizant of the essential elements in a special relationship but need also internalize the fact that America does not abandon liberal democracies. Just as Free Kurdistan should not want to limit its relationship with the US to either of one of the two major political parties in the United States so should they obviously never ask Washington to limit its support for Free Kurdistan to one or two of the three ruling Kurdish political parties and their respective Kurdistani self-governing regions. Acting like tribal leaders promoting partisan interests over Kurdistani interests does not give a serious impression to an official American diplomatic audience and seems tragicomically incompetent from the diplomatic perspective of Jerusalem. A special relationship is crucially a mutual relationship and not as Kurdish leaders see it a feudal-style relationship between between a client and its patron. Kurdistani leaders thus need to substantially politically invest in its two most important strategic relationships.
Free Kurdistan’s diplomatic relationship with the Dönmeh-led Derin Devlet (Turkish for “Deep State”) is however Kurdistan’s third most important strategic relationship and Free Kurdistan therefore needs to increasingly deepen its strategic dialogue with the Derin Devlet. This means in particular that the PKK and the Derin Devlet need to strategically synchronize their strategic, tactical and security policies in the current struggle between Islamists and non-Islamists in Turkey and Bakur (North Kurdistan inside the borders of Turkey). As the Derin Devlet were never Turkish nationalists but rather wielded Turkish nationalism generally and Kemalism specifically as political tools for their own domestic secularization agenda in the Republic of Turkey should there be no real obstacle (other than of course understandable Kurdish suspicions) to deepening the strategic dialogue between Free Kurdistan and the Derin Devlet, including especially so between Rojava (West Kurdistan as mostly within the borders of Syria) and the Derin Devlet.
As Syria needs to be reconfigured with significant border changes into a unified Aram/Alawistan is Damascus as increasingly closely allied with Jerusalem indeed Free Kurdistan’s fourth most important strategic relationship and especially so considering that Rojava will not be part of Aram/Alawistan. Indeed, the establishment of Aram/Alawistan needs to be based on three pillars 1) local communal reversion to the Alawi denomination of Priestly Judaism of Median Judaism in the Middle East, 2) reintroducing Aramaic as the main language of instruction in schools and as co-official with Oghuz/Turkish and the major language of Ammiyya which is written with a Latin orthography in Lebanon with numbers to indicate Semitic sounds 3) as well as a prudent, incremental and feminist bottom up approach to establishing open society and liberal democracy. Initially would Aram and Alawistan be separate states but the two should soon be merged if the people of Aram genuinely so desires on the common basis of communal reversion to Alawism and the Aramaic language. Aram/Alawistan will include most of Lebanon, most of western Syria and parts of southern Turkey. The final name of the unified state should however be Aram. The Euphrates river valley as currently controlled by Daesh was in contrast Yezidi prior to Islamization and so a Yezidi state needs to be established there south of Kurdistan as based on linguistic reversion to the Aramaic language and communal reversion to Yezidism, another denomination of Priestly Judaism of Median Judaism in the Middle East. Êzîdxan (the future Yezidi Aramaic state) should however not include Kurdish Yezidi regions (unless they wish so) but Kurdish Yezidis are rather essential in the reversion to Yezidism of once Yezidi regions of Kurdistan, including Rojava which was once fully Yezidi.
Free Kurdistan hence needs to nurture regional relationships with a view of drawing a new map of the Middle East as based on reversion to pre-Islamic languages, regional forms of Median Judaism and democratic borders that give those concerned a say in the redrawing of borders, including in what is now the Republic of Turkey where historical indigenous Anatolian languages need to be revived and a number of new linguistic states established there on the basis of those heritage languages. What is needed therefore is futuristic Kurdistani diplomatic leadership and the building of strategic relationships with a view towards a new map of the Middle East without religious imperialism. Indeed this future requires Free Kurdistan to adopt a foreign policy as based on democratic realism, namely diplomatic realism as grounded in the value system of open society & liberal democracy. Indeed foreign policy worldwide is often realism cynically masquerading as idealism and so democratic realism instead finds the perfect ethico-political balance between idealism and realism.
As Free Kurdistan increasingly evolves into a regional powerhouse on the path to independence for a unified Kurdistan in a region where Jihadism discredits Islamism and Islamism discredits Islam itself needs Free Kurdistan become a model for others in every respect in the region and so Free Kurdistan needs to nurture strategic relationships with the post-Muslim leaderships of most so called “Muslim” countries. Indeed, Iran itself is one of the world’s most secular countries and most of its human population no longer believes in Islam (although many still overtly pretend to) and so Free Kurdistan needs to navigate itself into a post-Muslim broader Middle East that leaves Islam behind by means of reversion to regional forms of Median Judaism. Free Kurdistan therefore also needs to create triangular relationships involving Israel’s other post-Muslim allies in the broader region.
Free Kurdistan hence needs to adopt a futuristic diplomatic policy as based on democratic realism and which is cognizant that Kurdistan does not exist in a political vacuum but rather that independence for a unified Kurdistan is part of many absolutely necessary political changes in an increasingly post-Muslim broader Middle East.