Common External Policy for Kurdistan

Feminism is the path to freedom, democracy and self-determination in Kurdistan and in the broader Middle East. (Image by Kurdishstruggle on Flickr)

The neighbours of Kurdistan traditionally play a political game of divide and rule in order to keep Kurds and Kurdistan weak, divided and confused. Thus have the AKP Islamist regime tried to play out the self-governing Badinan (Adiabene) region ruled by the KDP against the Rojava region (Western or Syrian Kurdistan) as ruled by the PYD and which is affiliated with the broader PKK movement. The Islamist regime of Iran and the Islamist regime of Turkey similarly tried to weaken Iraqi Kurdistan by playing out its two main regional ruling political parties (PUK and KDP) against each other.

The purpose of course in both cases was not only to weaken Free Kurdistan but also to weaken Israeli regional influence in terms of the regional balance of power as all three regions are supported and protected as part of the Israeli-American and Israeli-Kurdistani special relationships that make up the triangular relationship between the United States, Israel and Free Kurdistan.

The three main Kurdish political parties, the PKK (including the PYD), the PUK and the KDP are rivals that fear and loathe each due to a tragic history of internecine Kurdistani conflict as well as because they don’t understand that regional policies of rival Kurdish political parties that they indeed consider treasonous are simply expressive of fear and weakness on the part of rival Kurdish political parties vis-à-vis powerful Islamist neighbors of Free Kurdistan.

Free Kurdistan thus is weak both due to its landlocked geopolitical position and because the three self-governing Kurdistani regions are not only divided among each other but indeed expect the worst from each other. Playing divide and rule has hence been easy for Kurdistan’s Islamist adversaries considering how naively receptive ethnic Kurds tend to be to disinformation about rival Kurdish political parties.

As the balance of power in the internal power struggle in Turkey between Islamists and the Dönmeh-led Derin Devlet is increasingly shifting to the advantage of the Derin Devlet is it vital that the Derin Devlet recognizes Free Kurdistan as not only a new and important ally but indeed also as an important bulwark in the struggle against Islamism considering that Rojava’s feminist methods for reducing the role of organized religion in society are far more sophisticated than those historically deployed by Kemalism in Turkey and in Bakur (Northern or Turkish Kurdistan). It is hence vital that the Derin Devlet substantially intervenes to end Ankara’s political pressure against the KDP and that the KDP’s “cold policy” towards Rojava thus ends as this “cold policy” is the very outcome of AKP pressure on the KDP. Indeed both the Derin Devlet and the KDP are led by ethnic Dönmeh and so it is vital to strive to eliminate Islamist influence over Free Kurdistan and the region as a whole, including Turkey and Bakur.

What is also very much needed is a common external policy for Free Kurdistan that is able to withstand neighboring Islamist pressure. It is hence vital that internal relations between the self-governing regions of Free Kurdistan are based on strong principles. Free Kurdistan needs to practice internal free and fair trade, freedom of movement and need also agree on a comprehensive commitment to gradual democratization, including importantly communal reversion to pre-Islamic Kurdish religion, i.e. primarily to Median Judaism in Kurdistan (Alawism, Alevi-Bektashi, Yarsanism and Yezidism) but also to Kurdish Rabbinic Judaism to some extent and primarily so in the Badinan/Adiabene self-governing region.

What is also very much needed is an inter-governmental provisional regional organization comprising the three regions of Free Kurdistan as modeled on Switzerland. Indeed, Switzerland has three levels of citizenship, these are 1) municipal citizenship, 2) cantonal citizenship and 3) confederal citizenship. While the people of Free Kurdistan are citizens of Syria and Iraq and will remain so until a united Kurdistan gains independence need these three levels of citizenship become implemented in Free Kurdistan in addition to existing Iraqi and Syrian citizenships. Feminist Rojava is founded on what is known as democratic confederalism which is based on non-domination and local feminist democratization. The people of Free Kurdistan should thus be granted municipal citizenship and cantonal citizenship as well as a common confederal citizenship of Free Kurdistan generally while meanwhile retaining their Iraqi and Syrian national citizenships.

The three self-governing regions of Free Kurdistan need also consider the negative effects of engaging in propaganda against each other and importantly need to educate Kurds in also not believing in external propaganda designed to weaken, divide and confuse the people of Kurdistan. The three self-governing regions of Free Kurdistan certainly need to consider that knowledge is power and that it is vital to shift tack from spreading propaganda to rather providing accurate information. It is difficult for an oppressed group to liberate itself without having access to knowledge about who they are – as providing factual information both politically and in the academic field of Kurdology is indeed an essential element in the liberation of Kurdistan.

Israel has a long record of acting fairly towards all three self-governing regions of Free Kurdistan and so Israeli diplomatic mediation will continually be needed in order so as to increasingly strengthen a new confederal structure of Free Kurdistan. Political concerns that the three regions have about each other will therefore need to be continually raised with the Israeli mediating mechanism as the Israeli diplomatic role is indeed essential in helping ensure increasing regional integration within a confederal Free Kurdistan as committed to incremental democratization from below, including crucially communal reversion to Kurdish religion, something which is essential for the Dönmeh-led KDP to dare to implement actual democratization and liberalization as they as Crypto-Jews indeed very much fear a political scenario leading to Muslim rule.

While the three main Kurdish political parties obviously should not be expected to agree on everything is it nevertheless essential that they gain more informed insight into how the respective leaderships of rival Kurdish political parties internally reason and make actual political decisions. The culture of fear whereby Kurdistani political decision-making is precisely misguided by fear is not only counterproductive but also serves to tragically weaken Free Kurdistan as subject to power games of divide and rule by neighboring Islamist regimes. While it is important to early detect and proactively counteract potential future dangers should one not allow oneself to be led by fears as that tends to produce bad decisions indeed.

While it is obviously for Free Kurdistan to decide when Israel will open official diplomatic missions in Free Kurdistan should the three self-governing regions certainly ponder that a considerable official Israeli presence – both diplomatic and military – will serve to very substantially strengthen Free Kurdistan and make it much less vulnerable to hostile pressure from neighboring Islamist regimes. While Israel already has a considerable unofficial presence in Free Kurdistan with respect to trade and economic relations, the diplomatic service of the Israeli intelligence community and the considerable Israeli contribution to Free Kurdistan’s war against Daesh will turning this existing presence official serve to immensely strengthen the regional diplomatic posture of Free Kurdistan vis-à-vis regional adversaries.

Israel has strong official diplomatic relations with both Jordan and Turkey (thanks mainly to the Derin Devlet) and excellent unofficial diplomatic relations with Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and GCC monarchies and there are even increasing unofficial diplomatic ties with powerful parts of the Iranian political establishment. Indeed the three self-governing regions of Free Kurdistan certainly need to better understand that what strengthens Free Kurdistan also strengthens Israel in terms of the regional balance of power and that conversely what strengthens Israel also strengthens Free Kurdistan in terms of the same regional balance of power. Free Kurdistan thus in essence needs to become one gigantic Israeli aircraft carrier which in turn will transform Free Kurdistan into a defensive military iron fist. This will not only immensely strengthen Israel’s regional posture as the sole regional great power but will obviously as combined with a defense agreement between Free Kurdistan and Israel provide Free Kurdistan with the kind of military and political insurance policy that it needs so as to be able to defend itself against all external threats.

Free Kurdistan needs to become a far more sophisticated regional player as committed to the promotion of Kurdistani interests and the more united the more powerful will Free Kurdistan also become. The path to independence for unified Kurdistan is clear and it goes through incrementally increasing Kurdistani political unity. Although it is by no means easy to overcome historical grievances is the Israeli diplomatic role essential precisely as Israel is the primary political partner of all three self-governing regions of Free Kurdistan and Israel will certainly not abandon any of them in favor of another. Indeed, if Free Kurdistan is serious about building a special relationship with the United States in addition to the Israeli-Kurdistani special relationship and the Israeli-American special relationship that make up the triangular relationship between Israel, America and Free Kurdistan – need Kurdistani leaders understand that they must prove themselves capable of transforming Free Kurdistan into an increasingly unified regional powerhouse. The more powerful (both in terms of soft power and hard power), the more valuable does indeed Free Kurdistan become to its Israeli and American allies.

The process of regional integration in Kurdistan is by no means easy, yet Kurdistani leaders need to become far more vision-oriented and proactively prevent dangers rather than as so far largely allowing themselves to be misled by their own fears. Indeed, fear is a highly problematic companion to say the least and so Kurdistani leaders need to prove that they are indeed greater than their own fears. Confederal integration in the economic, diplomatic, security, military and intelligence spheres will certainly need to happen in a gradual and decentralized manner that will safeguard against further outbreaks of internecine Kurdish warfare. The Israeli mediating mechanism will therefore be essential so as to early address concerns, grievances and fears on the part of the self-governing regions of Kurdistan. The people of Kurdistan wants independence for a unified Kurdistan and that requires not only a common vision but indeed a common path to freedom.